Opinion
Putin sent this critic to prison as a birthday present. I spoke to him from his cell
Peter Hartcher
Political and international editorWhen Vladimir Putin made it a crime punishable by up to 15 years’ jail for Russians to criticise his invasion of Ukraine, he wasn’t just trying to silence dissent. He was hoping to drive all his political opponents out of Russia altogether. Almost all fled.
The Kremlin uses repression “to silence everyone and create an illusion of unanimous popular support for Putin’s aggressive policies”, says a leading opposition politician, Ilya Yashin.
“But here I am. I live in Russia, I didn’t flee anywhere, I openly call Putin a war criminal and the war he unleashed a catastrophe.” Which explains why Yashin is making these comments from inside a Russian jail cell. His lawyer conveyed my questions to him and returned with his handwritten responses.
“I knew that my arrest was inevitable,” says Yashin. Specifically, he was arrested 13 months ago, on the eve of his 39th birthday, the timing a common “present”, as he puts it, that the Russian security forces like to give dissidents for maximum psychological effect.
He’s been sentenced to 8½ years’ jail for a YouTube discussion of the appalling Russian massacre of Ukrainian civilians in the town of Bucha.
So why did he remain in Russia when others fled? “It seemed to me a matter of fundamental importance that anti-war voices continued to be heard not only abroad and in emigration, but within Russia,” he says in his first jail interview with an Australian media outlet.
“In this way, I am trying to save my country’s reputation and to inspire those inside Russia who don’t want a totalitarian and militarist future.”
Yashin is “one of the most promising, one of the most principled and one of the most fearless people in the Russian democratic movement”, attests an expert on Russian politics, Robert Horvath of La Trobe University, “alongside Alexei Navalny and Vladimir Kara-Murza”.
“Yashin matters. If Putin falls, Yashin will be prime minister or a senior minister – and he’s still young. He’s extremely charismatic and absolutely fearless. The only thing in his way is if authoritarianism endures. Or if Putin kills him.”
Yashin is sure of his cause and confident that he represents a great many of Russia’s people. Which is precisely why Putin jailed him, he explains. “I know that the repression of dissidents is a sign of the regime’s weakness. The fact that Putin tries to silence our voices means that he understands that our ideas are popular in society. Otherwise, he would have simply ignored us.
“In prison, I have already received over 20,000 letters with words of gratitude. All this fills me with strength and makes the ground under my feet firmer. Yes, prison is an unpleasant place and life here is very hard. But, unfortunately, the path to freedom and democracy often leads through prison bars and barbed wire, as history shows.”
But how much support does Putin enjoy? The Ukraine invasion was designed to boost Putin’s popularity, says Yashin. With pension reform and other difficulties harming his public standing, Putin “decided to restore his waning popularity via his usual methods – flexing his muscles on the international stage by conquering a neighbouring country”, says Yashin.
Putin was emboldened by the world’s response to his 2014 attack on Ukraine, during which MH17 was shot down by Russian-controlled forces. The world’s response was so feeble that it amounted to appeasement, argues Yashin. “However, this time Ukraine was much better prepared and was able to fight back. And this is a huge problem for Putin, as a drawn-out war inflicts significant economic and political costs.
“The war fatigue within Russian society is increasing. People are disappointed with the armed forces, they are demoralised and scared by increasingly frequent attacks on Russian cities, they are frustrated by Putin’s inability to find a way out of this situation. This dull irritation hasn’t led to a political crisis yet, but first signs are already visible in the mutiny of Wagner [the mercenary group led by Yevgeny Prigozhin].”
A sign of just how unpopular Putin’s war has become? Yashin points to estimates that perhaps a million people left Russia over the past year. “I want to emphasise that at least twice as many Russian citizens left the country than those who reported to the military enlistment offices during the mobilisation. Had the war been indeed popular, we would have witnessed queues to the enlistment offices instead of at the border checkpoints.”
He points to another sign – the regional election campaigns under way in Russia. “Observers have noticed that the party in power is carefully avoiding mentioning war-related topics. The reason is that the families of the mobilised are continuing to receive the bodies of their fathers and sons in coffins.”
Yashin doesn’t trust the opinion polls, which typically give Putin a supposed approval rating of around 80 per cent. He estimates the core of Putin’s support at about a quarter of the population. Another quarter oppose the war, he guesses, with most people experiencing the war “as they would a natural disaster – trying to survive it, wait it out, adapt to the new reality”.
Putin will cling to power to the bitter end regardless of the course of the war but “I would not completely discount the possibility of Putin’s removal as a result of popular unrest or a coup”, Yashin says. “That said, the situation is not yet ripe for that.”
Yashin doesn’t have any particular connection to Australia, but he wants to send a message to the Australian people, not to plead for himself but for his country. “I want to say that our people should not be equated with the junta that seized the power in Kremlin.
“War and dictatorship are not the choice of my compatriots. These are the shackles that were put on my people by thieves and murderers. Don’t give up on my country … Putin is not eternal. There will come a day when we will return to the community of civilised countries.”
Ilya Yashin is in jail. But the world knows who the real criminal is.
Peter Hartcher is international editor
The full Q&A with Ilya Yashin
What’s the current status of your case? And the circumstances of your detention? I think your birthday was last week — how did you spend the day?
I was arrested in late June last year, literally a day shy of my 39th birthday. Russian security forces love to make “presents” like this to opposition activists: arrests, searches, and interrogations often coincide with birthdays or other family celebrations. It’s a common practice.
On June 27, 2022, I was enjoying a late evening walk with my friend in a park in Moscow. Unexpectedly a heavily equipped police unit in body armour sprung out of the bushes. They literally carried me onto a police bus and took me to a police station. They drew up a report that I allegedly threw myself at a passing police patrol, swearing at them, prodding them in the chest, and trying to tear off their shoulder straps. All that sounded so absurd that even the judge laughed at the report. But that didn’t stop him from sentencing me to a 15-day arrest in an administrative detention centre, despite the obviously fraudulent accusation.
Later I found out why it was necessary for them to lock me up, as there was a criminal case against me, and my arrest was imminent. Two weeks later I was arrested right at the exit from the detention centre upon my release. First I was taken to my apartment under police escort where they proceeded to conduct a search, then I was interrogated at the Investigative Committee and that same evening I was put in a prison where I am still incarcerated 13 months later.
The criminal charges against me were laid for my public criticism of the military operation in Ukraine, which I openly called Putin’s aggression. The case is based specifically on my YouTube stream where I talk about the massacre perpetrated by Russian soldiers in the Ukrainian town of Bucha. The court found me guilty of “discrediting” the armed forces for sharing my opinion about the war and I was sentenced to 8.5 years in jail. The verdict is completely absurd – in Russia, robbery, rape and murder are often penalised by less jail time.
A month and a half ago I spent my second birthday behind bars. My family was able to send me a cake that I shared with my cellmates – a drug kingpin, an arms dealer, and a conman... And of course, I received a ton of letters and postcards from the outside.
You must have known the risks you faced in criticising Putin and his war. Why did you choose to stay in Russia?
I knew that my arrest was inevitable. Since the first days of the invasion of Ukraine, Putin also started a war against his critics inside Russia. Legislation was drastically tightened and virtually any criticism of the regime or the war was criminalised. There were mass arrests across the country. People were detained for walking with flowers and banners, for calling for peace on social media and even for liking posts about it. Priests were being arrested for anti-war sermons, journalists for their articles, theatre directors for plays that were deemed unacceptable [by the State]. People were shocked by the story of a man who was sentenced to two years in jail for an anti-war picture that his daughter drew in school during an art class.
It was obvious that the Kremlin left opposition politicians with no choice but to emigrate. The authorities clearly indicated that all of us who don’t leave will be sent behind bars. Almost all my colleagues from the opposition left Russia. But I decided to stay. Why? It seemed to me a matter of fundamental importance that anti-war voices continued to be heard not only abroad and in emigration, but within Russia. The Kremlin uses repressions and scare tactics to silence everyone and create an illusion of unanimous popular support for Putin’s aggressive policies, to show that there is no one in opposition to him. But here I am. I live in Russia, I didn’t flee anywhere, I openly call Putin a war criminal and the war he unleashed – a catastrophe. I did this before my arrest and I will continue honestly to call things by their real names, while I am behind bars, in court hearings, in correspondence with journalists and in manifestos that I write in prison and that are being posted on my social media. In this way, I am trying to save my country’s reputation and to inspire those inside Russia who don’t want a totalitarian and militarist future.
Has the jail sentence tested your commitment or strengthened it?
I was morally prepared for arrest and understand that I must be worthy of passing this test. To be in this kind of situation is a serious challenge and a great responsibility. After all, there are many people in Russia who want to stop the war and dream about regime change. There are many more such people than is commonly believed. Psychologically, it’s very difficult for them: they are depressed, scared and demoralised. How I conduct myself behind bars, how I withstand the pressure, will influence whether my supporters and like-minded people succumb to greater apathy or, on the contrary, are emboldened and acquire strength to fight for their future.
My belief that my cause is just is strong as ever, and prison has not shaken it. I know that I am incarcerated for speaking the truth and that true killers put me here. I know that the repression of dissidents is a sign of the regime’s weakness. The fact that Putin tries to silence our voices means that he understands that our ideas are popular in society. Otherwise, he would have simply ignored us. I have felt this support from citizens. The courtrooms during my trials were always completely full of my supporters – people who had stood in long queues to get in while hundreds of more had to stand outside by the windows. In prison, I have already received over 20,000 letters with words of gratitude. All this fills me with strength and makes the ground under my feet firmer. Yes, prison is an unpleasant place and life here is very hard. But, unfortunately, the path to freedom and democracy often leads through prison bars and barbed wire, as history shows. And one has to complete this journey without losing oneself but gaining life experience and growing wiser.
What’s your best guess at the proportion of Russians who share your views on Putin’s regime — and the war?
I do not want to speculate about numbers and percentages. Firstly, because I am not a sociologist. And secondly, because opinion polls in dictatorships, as a matter of principle, cannot provide a true reflection of real mood within the society. Imagine a person in a small Russian town who is sitting in his kitchen in the evening, reading about yet more arrests of opposition supporters and anti-war activists, about more Draconian laws being passed ... Suddenly, the phone rings and an unknown interviewer on the other side of the line is asking about their attitude to Putin’s actions in Ukraine. Most likely, this person will say that they approve and support everything. But do they really think that or are they afraid to tell the truth? It’s a debatable question.
Nevertheless, I can share my own subjective assessment based on my personal interactions with people around me. I think that the majority of Russians are not supporters of military aggression, but they are not prepared to condemn it clearly and deliberately. They experience the war and the related challenges as they would a natural disaster – trying to survive it, wait it out, adapt to the new reality.
The core of Putin’s support is probably about a quarter of the country’s population. These are mainly people in the regions who consume information from TV, government workers and employees of the military-industrial complex, whose income has increased significantly, but also retired military personnel with revanchist ideas. However, among these retirees nostalgic about the USSR, there is also growing disenchantment with the authorities because the war in Ukraine is far from a triumph and it revealed the scale of corruption, the inefficiency and the ineffectiveness of the Russian army. As a result, Putin’s radical supporters are criticising him more and more and become targets of political persecution themselves. In this regard, the case of Igor Girkin is exemplary. Girkin, a retired FSB officer and the leader of “The Angry Patriots Club”, was one of the key instigators of the bloody conflict in Donbass in 2014 and he was convicted in absentia for the shooting down of the Malaysian MH17 passenger plane over Ukraine by Russian-controlled forces. Now Putin has arrested him for criticising the Russian Ministry of Defence, charging him with “extremism”.
Finally, it seems to me that opponents of the war make up about a quarter of the adult Russian population. These are mostly residents of large cities, those with a university education, those who are active internet users, and representatives of the middle class. Many of them were forced to leave Russia after the start of the invasion out of fear for their own safety. The second large wave of this emigration took place last fall and was linked to the mobilisation. According to some assessments, around one million people left our country in the past year for political and humanitarian reasons and, of course, this is primarily citizens with a negative attitude towards Putin. In this connection, I want to emphasise that at least twice as many Russian citizens left the country than those who reported to the military enlistment offices during the mobilisation. Had the war been indeed popular, we would have witnessed queues to the enlistment offices instead of at the border checkpoints.
But plenty of people with anti-war attitudes remain in Russia, in my opinion. They are also adapting and are afraid to express their views openly. But I feel their number is growing. For example, regional election campaigns have now started in Russia and observers have noticed that the party in power is carefully avoiding mentioning war-related topics. The reason is that the families of the mobilised are continuing to receive the bodies of their fathers and sons in coffins. People are getting more frustrated by the war, while sources in election campaigns admit to journalists that speaking with the electorate about the war is becoming very risky – in some districts it can lead to protest voting.
How should we understand the connection between Putin’s domestic political situation and the invasion of Ukraine?
Putin was obviously planning what history books usually call a “small victorious war”. A swift invasion of Ukraine, the occupation of Kyiv and forceful installation of a pro-Kremlin regime should have strengthened Putin’s reputation as a tough and decisive leader and boosted his authority in the eyes of Russians.
This is what he did in 2014, when he annexed Crimea and installed puppet people’s republics in Donbass. This considerably boosted his popularity inside Russia because our country didn’t face any significant negative consequences for conquering territories of another country. The global community limited its reaction to mild sanctions and de facto just accepted Putin’s aggression. Western political leaders continued business as usual with the Kremlin as if nothing significant happened, making deals, visiting Moscow for negotiations and keeping Putin company at the stadium while watching soccer games during the World Cup in Russia in 2018.
History teaches us that there are always consequences when you try to appease aggression. By 2022, Putin became convinced that he can do anything he wants without consequences, so his ambition grew; but, on the other hand, his relations with Russian society became strained after a series of unpopular decisions, including the reform of the pension system. And so, the president decided to restore his waning popularity via his usual methods: flexing his muscles on the international stage by conquering a neighbouring country. However, this time Ukraine was much better prepared and was able to fight back. And this is a huge problem for Putin, as a drawn-out war inflicts significant economic and political costs. The war fatigue within Russian society is increasing. People are disappointed with the armed forces, they are demoralised and scared by increasingly frequent attacks on Russian cities, they are frustrated by Putin’s inability to find a way out of this situation. This dull irritation hasn’t led to a political crisis yet, but first signs are already visible in the mutiny of Wagner PMC, for example. But the longer this continues, the greater the risks will be for the regime.
Alexei Navalny recently had his jail sentence extended from nine years to 19. Why would the regime bother to do this?
Navalny is not only the leader of Russian opposition but also a politician whom Putin sees as a personal enemy. The reason for this personal hate is that Alexey shattered the public image of the president as a wise, ascetic, and just father of the nation in the eyes of the Russian people. With his anti-corruption investigations, Navalny opened the curtains of power and showed that the Kremlin is headed by a selfish, petty, luxury-loving individual, who is wallowing in corruption and despotism; that despite mass poverty in Russia, he hands off multi-billion-dollar assets to his friends, turning them into oligarchs. Navalny has shown that it is possible not to be afraid of Putin, despite political repressions and mortal danger – he has become a unique model of civic courage. Even the assassination attempt and incarceration in torturous conditions has not silenced Alexey. That is why the endless multitude of criminal cases against him, in my opinion, are motivated more by Putin’s emotions and vindictiveness rather than rational political calculation. The president is trying to “roll his enemy into asphalt”, using the full might of the state machine, trying to break his will and force a public renunciation of his views. But Putin is not succeeding.
Do you have any forecasts of how the war on Ukraine might unfold? Forecasts of Putin’s future?
The initiative is obviously on Kiev’s side right now and the end of the war depends primarily on the will of the Ukrainians, as well as the patience of their Western allies. Putin is clearly ready for negotiations. He regularly talks about it: the most recent statement was made at the meeting with Africa delegations. And the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs echoes the president, emphasising that the peace agreement should be brokered with a view to the “prevailing realities”. What does it mean? In fact, they imply the freezing of the conflict along the current line of engagement under the “peace in exchange for territory” formula. To put it crudely, Ukraine is offered a ceasefire while Russia will continue controlling the Ukrainian territories and cities the Kremlin managed to occupy over the past year and a half.
If, after weighing the pros and cons, Kiev agrees to such a scenario, then the hot phase of the conflict will finish already this fall. If the Ukrainians resolve to keep on fighting for the return of their territories, the war will continue and, most likely, last a long time. But the cost of the war will continue to grow. And by that, I am referring not to money or arms supplies, but above all to the human cost. But the decision, I repeat, is for the Ukrainian people to make.
As for Putin’s future, there is no doubt that he will cling to power until the end. This man became a real war criminal and the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for him. It is clear that he will not leave the Kremlin on his own accord, and he will continue holding the Russian people hostage and threaten the whole world with a nuclear apocalypse. At the same time, Putin has become a toxic figure even for Russian citizens, tens of thousands of whom he sends to slaughter, and for big business, which is now under heavy sanctions, and for the bureaucracy that has found itself in total isolation. Because of this, I would not completely discount the possibility of Putin’s removal as a result of popular unrest or a coup. This can be influenced by big military defeats, a growing hole in the budget and the general collective mood within the society that Putin is destroying the country’s future. That said, the situation is not yet ripe for that, of course.
What connections do you have to Australia, if any?
I have never been to Australia, but I know of many Russians with active anti-war, pro-democratic views, residing in your country. They form pro-democracy groups, picket the Russian embassy, help Ukrainian refugees, support Russian political prisoners. I regularly receive heartwarming letters from Russian Australians and am very happy to learn of the many like-minded people who, despite great distance and choice to live in another country, wish freedom and happiness for our homeland and are ready to help.
Do you have any requests of the Australian government?
I don’t think that it will be proper for me to appeal to foreign governments with requests. Such requests to the Australian government will be more appropriate coming from Australian citizens.
I prefer to appeal not to governments, but to civil society. And my message to Australians is simple. I know that my country’s reputation around the world has seen better days: because of Putin’s aggression, Russians are viewed with suspicion, we are feared, and we are viewed as invaders [lit: occupiers]. I want to say that our people should not be equated with the junta that seized the power in Kremlin. War and dictatorship are not the choice of my compatriots. These are the shackles that were put on my people by thieves and murderers. Don’t give up on my country, don’t build walls and don’t isolate Russians that are not stained by the war. Putin is not eternal. There will come a day when we will return to the community of civilised countries.